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Social homogamy, early industrialization, and marriage restrictions in 1 
the canton of Lucerne, Switzerland, 1834–75 2 
The modernization thesis assumes decreasing relevance of an individual’s family 3 
background to various aspects of modern and industrial life, which should also 4 
translate into a decrease in marital homogamy by social origin. However, long-5 
term historical processes are rarely unidimensional and monotonous, and multiple 6 
processes may mask one another. For example, although previous research 7 
provides evidence for a relationship between degree of industrialization and 8 
homogamy, most studies have found no clear time trend. Using new data 9 
(N=1,499) for the Swiss canton of Lucerne from the 19th century, data which 10 
include occupational status of fathers (HISCAM), this article approaches from 11 
two angles the problem of confounding processes. First, changes in marriage 12 
restrictions during the period of study are identified as a significant and 13 
unmeasurable confounder. Because the timespan of reinforced marriage 14 
restriction is known, time trends in homogamy can be modelled to allow partial 15 
disentanglement of the effects on homogamy of modernization and marriage 16 
restrictions. Second, although there were few direct measures of modernization 17 
taken in Lucerne during that period, two parish level measures can be identified: 18 
connection to the railway system, and the proportion of factory workers in the 19 
population. Using multilevel models with constraint simultaneous equations for 20 
both possible directions of explanation, the analyses reveal homogamy effects of 21 
industrialization and marriage restrictions that differ by social strata. In the lower 22 
and middle strata, homogamy was stronger in rural areas than in the city of 23 
Lucerne, while the opposite was true for the upper stratum. Furthermore, 24 
homogamy increased with rising levels of marriage restrictions but in lower and 25 
middle strata it decreased with industrialization. 26 
Keywords: social homogamy; industrialization; marriage restrictions; 19th 27 
century; Switzerland 28 
Although selection of a spouse is a very personal decision for both partners, it is always 29 
shaped by personal as well as structural factors, such as education, social origin, or the 30 
opportunity structure of a given context. One result of such assortative mating is 31 
homogamy, by which is meant that on average people choose partners who are in many 32 
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ways more similar to themselves than to randomly chosen others (Kalmijn, 1998; 1 
Schwartz, 2013) and in contemporary western societies the most important of those 2 
characteristics might be achieved personal characteristics like education (Blossfeld, 3 
2009; Kalmijn, 1991a). That would be in line with one of the central promises of 4 
modernization, which is that it will lead to open, socially fluid societies which ignore 5 
purely ascribed characteristics like social origin (Maas & van Leeuwen, 2016) although 6 
that promise has been questioned by recent and broadly discussed research on rising 7 
economic inequality. Authors like Piketty (2013) or Milanović (2016) have suggested 8 
that growing inequality and the increasing importance of capital returns could lead to a 9 
situation similar to that at the end of the 19th century when family resources mattered 10 
more than education or achievements. Such a development would be in complete 11 
opposition to the prediction of liberal economic theorists like Kuznets (1955), or Kerr, 12 
Dunlop, Harbison, and Myers (1960) and Treiman (1970) who were proponents of the 13 
modernization thesis. They assumed decreasing inequality, and continual reduction of 14 
the importance to status allocation of ascribed characteristics like social origin. 15 
In this article I shall analyse homogamy by reference to the social status of 16 
parents. The underlying assumption is that a strong link between social origin and a 17 
variety of aspects of the lives of brides and grooms means that we may presuppose 18 
strong homogamy by parental status. That in turn – all other things being equal – will 19 
lead to a decrease in the general importance of social origin in a given society and 20 
results in declining influence of social origin on selection of spouses (cf., Kalmijn, 21 
1991b; Zijdeman & Maas, 2010). Therefore, analysing homogamy in respect of social 22 
origin (subsequently abbreviated to “social homogamy” or simply “homogamy”) is one 23 
possible way to study the importance of social origin for individual lives. Applied to an 24 
area and period of industrialization, analysing social homogamy also provides a test for 25 
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the “logic of the industrialization process” (Kerr et al., 1960, p. 34): the assumption that 1 
industrialization is the most important driver for the decreasing importance of social 2 
origin. An analysis of social homogamy might therefore complement other analyses of 3 
social origin effects in such periods, such as studies of intergenerational social mobility 4 
using historical data (Lippényi, Maas, & van Leeuwen, 2015; van Leeuwen, Maas, 5 
Rébaudo, & Pélissier, 2016; Zijdeman, 2009). More generally it also adds to the debate 6 
inspired by the writings of Le Play (e.g., 1877-79) about whether industrialization and 7 
urbanization have changed the organization of the family (Janssens, 1986; Laslett, 1974; 8 
Puschmann & Solli, 2014). 9 
While homogamy might have changed according to the modernization thesis, 10 
modernization is unlikely to be the only relevant factor affecting changes in homogamy 11 
over time. For example, not only can the question of who marries whom be related to 12 
social origin, but so can the question of who gets married in the first place. The 13 
relationship itself, too, may change over time. As a reaction to 19th century pauperism 14 
many local and central authorities in Switzerland and other German speaking areas 15 
reinforced existing marriage restrictions with the aim of preventing the poor from 16 
proliferating (Head-König, 1993; Mantl, 1999; Matz, 1980). By placing emphasis on 17 
inherited property rather than on personal income, strong marriage restrictions helped to 18 
maintain unequal access to marriage (Mantl, 1999). In other words, the strengthening of 19 
marriage restrictions may have counteracted the general decreasing importance of social 20 
origin over the course of modernization. It is worth noting here that modernization and 21 
increasing marriage restrictions were not independent trends. For many commentators 22 
of the 19th century, the widespread pauperism was caused by industrialization (Mantl, 23 
1999) – which meant that stricter marriage restrictions were an indirect reaction to 24 
modernization.  25 
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Using new data drawn from 19th century canton of Lucerne this article aims to 1 
analyse the combined effects of industrialization and marriage restrictions. Lucerne 2 
operated some of Switzerland’s most severe marriage restrictions (Head-König, 1993) 3 
and while it remained primarily agrarian certain areas saw unmistakeable 4 
industrialization (Dubler, 1983; Schnider, 1996). Furthermore, Lucerne is one of the 5 
few cantons for which sources are available that systematically include the occupations 6 
of the fathers of both spouses in a marriage. For the period 1834–75 the central 7 
authorities of Lucerne took control of the church records and required parish priests to 8 
include in marriage registers information about occupations (Gössi & Huber, 2001). The 9 
period covers the early industrialization of certain areas of the canton but coincided too 10 
with a peak in marriage restrictions around 1865, whereafter they were relaxed again 11 
toward the end of the period (Bossard-Borner, 2008, pp. 532–550). These features of the 12 
data allow it at least partly to disentangle the effects of industrialization and changing 13 
marriage restrictions, even though only indirect measurements, such as illegitimacy 14 
rates, are available that do not allow estimating the severity of the marriage restrictions 15 
on the local level. However, two direct measurements of modernization are available at 16 
the level of individual parishes and they enrich the data. A variable on the presence of 17 
railway stations measures the availability of modern means of transport, and the 18 
proportion of factory workers serves as a proxy for the level of industrialization of a 19 
given parish. Although relatively crude, both those measures complement the indirect 20 
test of modernization effects using time trends. That is of special significance because 21 
most previous studies found no clear time trends (Bull, 2005; Dribe & Lundh, 2009; 22 
Maas & van Leeuwen, 2005; van Leeuwen & Maas, 2002), but were able to identify the 23 
effects of more directly measured industrialization (Maas, van Leeuwen, Pélissier, & 24 
Rébaudo, 2011; Zijdeman & Maas, 2010). 25 
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Research on social homogamy in 19th century Switzerland is actually very 1 
scarce and the few existing studies examine only the two Protestant cities of Winterthur 2 
(Schumacher & Lorenzetti, 2005) and Geneva (Widmer, 1993). This analysis of new 3 
data from a catholic and predominantly agrarian canton like Lucerne therefore addresses 4 
an area of which nothing was previously known about homogamy. Consequently, one 5 
of this article’s aims is to describe the homogamy by social origin seen in the city of 6 
Lucerne and the rural area around it, and to trace changes to it over the 40 years of the 7 
observed period (1834–75). However, the article’s main goal remains to derive and test 8 
hypotheses about how social homogamy changed with modernization, and how the 9 
process was affected by changing levels of marriage restriction in the canton. 10 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. The next section presents 11 
the background to the 19th century canton of Lucerne thereby providing the context for 12 
the marriages and marriage registers analysed in the article. Description of the historical 13 
background is followed by the theoretical considerations from which the hypotheses are 14 
derived and by a description of the data, measurements and statistical models that 15 
allowed us to test the hypotheses. Finally, the results are presented and discussed. 16 
1 The canton of Lucerne and the sources 17 
Lucerne is a medium sized canton in central Switzerland (see map at Figure 1) and 18 
throughout the 19th century remained a predominantly agrarian canton with the city of 19 
Lucerne its undisputed capital. At the beginning of the 19th century the canton was 20 
divided into three agrarian areas, with the partly alpine south defined by animal 21 
husbandry and production of milk and cheese, while the hilly central and flatter 22 
northern region devoted to the cultivation of grain, although the two areas differed in 23 
their modes of production. In central Lucerne canton field crops and fodder for small 24 
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livestock were produced on separate farms on mostly private land. In the northern areas 1 
by contrast, production was still organized using the three-field system which required 2 
collective farming (‘Flurzwang’), as individual farmers’ properties were dispersed over 3 
all three fields (Bossard-Borner, 1998, pp. 38–42; Dubler, 1983, pp. 71–95). 4 
---Figure 1 about here [Map] --- 5 
This ‘Flurzwang’ and the requirement to deliver tithes in the form of a prescribed 6 
composition of field crops, had constrained agricultural innovation during the 18th 7 
century until change came during the first half of the 19th century. Then, over the rest of 8 
the century agriculture in Lucerne canton saw strong modernization as municipalities 9 
were allowed to privatize parts of their commons, action which often led to improved 10 
situations for small farmers who could now increase production above subsistence level 11 
(Bossard-Borner, 1998, pp. 309–312). In addition the optional tithe redemption, 12 
together with the abolition of the ‘Flurzwang’, allowed wealthy farmers to change to 13 
more lucrative animal husbandry which increased their cash crops and in turn laid the 14 
foundation for the mechanization of farming towards the end of the 19th century. Those 15 
factors were the precondition for rational and market-oriented agriculture which 16 
increased yields enormously (Bossard-Borner, 1998, pp. 306–314; Dubler, 1983, 17 
pp. 95–113). 18 
In contrast to the rapid development of the agrarian sector, modernization of 19 
other sectors and factory industrialization took longer to take off. There were areas with 20 
growing industry, mainly around the capital and in the north eastern Wiggerthal 21 
(Bossard-Borner, 1998; Dubler, 1983). Before 1850 there were only a small number of 22 
factory workers in the canton, many of them employed in factories processing 23 
horsehair, a sector that disappeared sometime in the half of the 19th century. To a certain 24 
extent however, by the time of the second factory census in 1877, which was shortly 25 
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after the period analysed in this article, the situation had changed. Although the overall 1 
proportion of factory workers remained low and the canton’s industrialized area was 2 
roughly the same as it had been in 1850, industry became a significant factor in those 3 
few municipalities that could boast factories. Around Lucerne city for example, the 4 
proportion of factory workers approached 10% of the population as steel production, 5 
machine construction, and above all the textile industry had become relevant sectors 6 
(Schnider, 1996, pp. 41–56). Industrialization gained pace as some parts of the canton 7 
were connected to the Swiss railway system (see Figure 1) which also enabled the rise 8 
of Lucerne as an important tourist destination (Dubler, 1983; Schnider, 1996). 9 
The development of Lucerne as a modern tourist resort was also a significant 10 
accelerator of the growth of the city’s population, which was driven mainly by 11 
immigration, with female domestic workers featuring prominently among the 12 
predominantly intra-cantonal immigrants (Balthasar, 1988; Head-König, 1999). 13 
Therefore, migration to the city of Lucerne consisted not only of short-term movement, 14 
for example that of young people working in the city but returning when somewhat 15 
older, (see for example Ehmer, 2011), but also of many people who remained in the 16 
city. Migration to Lucerne city and its surroundings continued even after economic 17 
growth slowed down at the end of the 1840s, so that now unemployed migrants visibly 18 
added to the growing number of paupers during those years. In the middle years of the 19 
century the canton experienced economic tension due not only to growing competition 20 
from more industrialized areas but because of bad weather too which led to high prices 21 
of bread and potatoes (Bossard-Borner, 2008, pp. 532–541). This difficult situation was 22 
accentuated by a short war which preceded the partially forcible and conflict-laden 23 
integration into the newly-founded liberal federal state of Switzerland in 1848 (Bossard-24 
Borner, 2008, 2010).  25 
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By contrast with other cantons Lucerne did not outsource the resulting burden of 1 
poor relief by actively supporting emigration overseas. As in other German-speaking 2 
areas (Mantl, 1999; Matz, 1980) the authorities tried to forbid reproduction among the 3 
poor by strengthening existing marriage restrictions. That contributed to a marriage 4 
pattern in Lucerne that perfectly fits the “European Marriage Pattern” as depicted by 5 
Hajnal (1965, p. 101) namely “a high age at marriage and a high proportion of people 6 
who never marry at all”.1 Marriage restrictions were imposed on men who had either 7 
relied on poor relief after the age of 16 and had not repaid it, or who lacked the means 8 
the local authorities considered necessary to raise offspring in an “honest way” (Kanton 9 
Luzern, 1831–1840, pp. 261–270, cited in Bossard-Borner, 2008, p. 545). The central 10 
authorities backed up their rigid restrictions. Their judicial response to appeal against 11 
refusal of permission to marry was very restrictive until 1857, when as a result of the 12 
improved economic situation it suddenly became more liberal (Bossard-Borner, 2008, 13 
p. 545). The change in legal practice was reinforced by the fact that during the 14 
economic crisis, high marriage fees had become unaffordable to more and more people. 15 
                                                 
1 To the best of my knowledge, no comprehensive demographic statistic exists for the 19th 
century canton of Lucerne. However, in the sample used for this study the median age at first 
marriage of women and men was 27.0 and 31.9, respectively. From an additional sample 
collected from the death registers of five parishes (Altishofen, Entlebuch, Ettiswil, Hitzkirch, 
Kriens, and Lucerne) it can be estimated that about 20% of men survived beyond the age of 
45 remained unmarried. That corresponds to the number cited by Hajnal (1953, p. 85) for 
Switzerland and falls in about the middle of the range for the Austrian alpine region found 
by Ortmayr (1995); data based on: StALU, FA 29/8, 51, 64, 91, 118, 119; KZ 33, 35, 37, 39, 
41. 
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One consequence was that the illegitimacy rate which had been slowly increasing 1 
during the first half of the 19th century, rose quickly after 1845 until it peaked at about 2 
15%in 1864, before falling back to about 5% at the beginning of the 1870s (Bossard-3 
Borner, 1998, pp. 297–306, 2008, pp. 532–550; Head-König, 1993). The interplay of 4 
economic and political factors thus led to reinforced demographic characteristics of low 5 
marriage and high illegitimacy rates in the 19th century canton of Lucerne. For the 6 
present study, those demographic characteristics had three consequences:  7 
(1) The marriage restrictions were successful insofar as married individuals indeed 8 
belonged to a socially selected population: among those who died aged between 9 
45 and 64, 94% of merchants died married but only 47% of farm workers did 10 
so.2  11 
(2) The high illegitimacy rate may point to existing relationships out of wedlock. In 12 
many cases however, multiple fathers were involved when women had multiple 13 
illegitimate children (Kok & Leinarte, 2015). In other words, a high illegitimacy 14 
rate might suggest a high rate of unmarried couples although not necessarily so. 15 
As there is no systematic source for that time for unmarried couples, analysis of 16 
homogamy is therefore necessarily restricted to marital homogamy. 17 
(3) Increased marriage restrictions in the middle of the 19th century might have 18 
affected homogamy by social origin (see next section for arguments), which 19 
might in turn have disturbed trends caused by processes such as 20 
industrialization. According to the literature however marriage restrictions, 21 
while strong in the middle of the century, were relatively weak at the beginning 22 
                                                 
2  Source: see note 1. 
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and towards the end of the period observed in this article (1834–75) (Bossard-1 
Borner, 2008, pp. 532–550). Therefore the effect of marriage restriction on 2 
homogamy can be expected to have evolved accordingly, which helps to 3 
disentangle it from the effects of other processes. 4 
Because of the relatively high proportion of individuals who did not marry at all, 5 
marriage registers are a selective source. Nevertheless they are the only available source 6 
for the large scale study of parental homogamy in 19th century Lucerne. They are even 7 
an exceptional source, as most marriage registers in Switzerland do not include 8 
occupational titles of parents in any systematic way. That is true for the canton of 9 
Lucerne too, but not for the period 1834–75 investigated in this article. During a liberal 10 
intermezzo of 1831–41 the state of Lucerne decided to take control of parish registers. 11 
Pre-printed tables were issued for priests to fill in, and the law defined how state 12 
officials were required to monitor the maintenance of the registers.3 In comparison with 13 
other areas and periods then, for this period the canton of Lucerne offers marriage 14 
registers of exceptional quality, as the information in them is not only rich but was 15 
consistently and systematically collected. Their data therefore allows analysis of 16 
processes of social stratification, including homogamy by social origin. 17 
2 Theoretical considerations and hypotheses 18 
To explain changes in homogamy by parent’s social status two basic theoretical 19 
questions must be addressed. First, why such homogamy can be expected in the first 20 
                                                 
3  The corresponding decrees can be found at the beginning of each of the books. For this 
project we used the copies maintained by a municipality official and kept by the State 
Archives of Lucerne: StALU, A 975 and KZ 23-27, 54-56; cf.: Gössi and Huber (2001). 
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place And why the extent of homogamy may be assumed to change. 1 
A useful framework for the analysis of spouse selection and the factors driving 2 
homogamy is the concept of the “marriage market”. In a marriage market men and 3 
women seek partners according to their individual preferences but face constrained 4 
opportunities (Becker, 1973; Goode, 1964; Schwartz, 2013). Preferences and constraints 5 
alike can then lead to social homogamy, as the of actors in the marriage markets tend to 6 
favour status maintenance (Boudon, 1974), and to wish to maximize the socioeconomic 7 
resources of a future family and to prefer a partner with whom they share at least some 8 
cultural values (Kalmijn, 1998). The preferences for similarity and for more resources 9 
both lead to homogamy, as if both partners want more of the same and neither wishes to 10 
marry down, “everyone ends up with someone roughly similar to themselves” 11 
(Schwartz, 2013, p. 453). Of course, “everyone” is an exaggeration, as few will be able 12 
to satisfy all their preferences so in order to satisfy certain of them they may reduce 13 
their expectations in respect of others. That provides room for exchange; for example a 14 
relatively aesthetically unattractive but influential person might be able to marry an 15 
uneducated but wealthy partner (cf., Merton, 1941), a process which can explain a 16 
mating process with a heterogamous outcome. However, if it make sense to pool the 17 
resources of both partners, with resources seen as complements, not substitutes, the 18 
resulting partnership will nevertheless tend to be homogamous (Becker, 1973; Edwards, 19 
1969). In other words, if both partners value a particular resource, then having more of 20 
it (all else being equal) will improve the chances of mating with someone who 21 
possesses the same resource.  22 
2.1 Modernization thesis: the changing importance of social origin 23 
My intent in this article is to analyse homogamy by the status of the parents of a bridal 24 
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couple. Homogamy in that respect can exist only if the resources of bride and groom are 1 
linked to those of their parents. In other words, homogamy by social origin is a 2 
consequence of the association between the particular status of individuals and that of 3 
their parents. It is here that the modernization thesis comes into play. 4 
In the literature on social inequality and stratification the term “modernization 5 
thesis” usually refers to a construct based on the writings of Kerr et al. (1960), Parsons 6 
(e.g. 1960), and other North American social scientists of the 20th century (cf., Erikson 7 
& Goldthorpe, 1992, p. 3). In other words it is based on the concept of modernization in 8 
its “classical” form that took shape in the 1950s. In that view “modernization” is a 9 
combination of unidirectional processes mutually reinforcing each other, namely 10 
industrialization, democratization, bureaucratization, rationalization, and secularization 11 
(Mergel, 2012). The modernization thesis assumes that the change from a pre-industrial 12 
to an industrial society was quite fundamental and changed many aspects of life. While 13 
many aspects of it have been criticized (e.g., Tipps, 1973), the modernization thesis has 14 
created influential hypotheses in research on social stratification (Hout & DiPrete, 15 
2006). In that respect the modernization thesis states that social origin loses its 16 
importance in the allocation of social positions. More specifically, modernization is 17 
thought to change the process of status attainment, for while the thesis assumes that in 18 
traditional societies the direct link between parent’s and child’s status is dominant, it 19 
presumes that in modern societies an indirect path via education will be the main path 20 
connecting the status of parents and children. However the indirect path will not 21 
completely replace the direct one, which results in a weakening link between the 22 
generations (Blau & Duncan, 1967; Treiman, 1970). 23 
Following Treiman’s (1970) restatement of the modernization thesis, structural 24 
changes caused by industrialization result in reduction of the direct effect of social 25 
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origin on an individual’s social position. First, the reduction of the proportion of the 1 
labour force engaged in agriculture on the one hand and on the other the creation of new 2 
jobs following technological change and specialization, reduces too the number of jobs 3 
for which skills developed by assisting parents are beneficial (Knigge, Maas, van 4 
Leeuwen, & Mandemakers, 2014; Lipset & Zetterberg, 1959, pp. 57–60). Second, the 5 
increasing size of enterprises brings with it rationalization and bureaucratization of 6 
production. Rather than relying on ascribed characteristics like social origin, employers 7 
therefore increasingly consider such things as achievements in formal education, for 8 
such characteristics are more relevant to an estimation of likely productivity (Treiman, 9 
1970). Together, such changes make it more difficult to use existing socioeconomic 10 
resources directly to grant status maintenance of the succeeding generations. 11 
Conversely, those changes ought to be expected to open formerly closed social 12 
positions to individuals less well endowed with resources of social origin. Furthermore, 13 
the modernization thesis predicts that political, social, and cultural resources will be 14 
available to more people. In that view democratization improves the ability of the 15 
disadvantaged classes to profit from the economic growth generated by industrialization 16 
(Simpson, 1990). Furthermore, educational expansion not only provides the population 17 
with the knowledge and skills necessary for newly created occupations, but also creates 18 
opportunity for pupils to meet others from different class backgrounds (Kerr et al., 19 
1960, pp. 36–37; van Leeuwen & Maas, 2005). The emergence of mass media and 20 
modern transport supports the development of a common culture and with it the 21 
diminution of differences “in attitudes and behavior” by social origin (Treiman, 1970, 22 
p. 219). 23 
Taken together, these arguments imply decreasing influence of social origin over 24 
the course of modernization, which means too that homogamy should decline in respect 25 
15 
 
of the social status of parents, for at least two reasons. First, according to the 1 
modernization thesis cultural resources depend decreasingly on social origin. 2 
Consequently, the cultural similarity preferred by actors on the marriage marked 3 
depends less and less on social origin. Second, when actors try to maximize resources 4 
for their future family, social origin is of decreasing relevance, because the 5 
modernization thesis assumes the weakening of links between an individual’s own 6 
resources and those of his or her family of origin (Kalmijn, 1991b). That leads us to this 7 
first hypothesis:4 8 
H1: Social homogamy has decreased over time. 9 
Because urbanization is viewed as being inherently a driver of modernization (Kuznets, 10 
1955; Treiman, 1970), we may expect the importance of social origin to decrease more 11 
significantly in cities than in rural areas. Furthermore, the city of Lucerne was more 12 
advanced than other parts of the canton in many of the aspects discussed above. It had 13 
better schools and provided education to a higher level (Boesch & Kottmann, 1974; 14 
Pfenniger, 1998) offered a wider variety of occupations (Dubler, 1983) and was the 15 
home of most of the canton’s early entrepreneurs (Bossard-Borner, 1998, p. 318) and of 16 
its intellectual elite (Bossard-Borner, 1998, pp. 353–360). It was also the capital, and 17 
the canton’s central administration and its civil servants were based there (Lischer, 18 
2016). That leads us to this second hypothesis based on the modernization thesis: 19 
H2: Social homogamy was stronger in rural areas than in the city of Lucerne. 20 
                                                 
4  For a similar hypothesis, see Zijdeman and Maas (2010, p. 399). 
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2.2 The effect of marriage restrictions 1 
However, for the period of interest to us here the assumption implicitly made by the 2 
modernization thesis that “everything else was equal” was clearly not correct. With the 3 
marriage restrictions discussed in the last section an important constraint on the 4 
selection of spouses changed significantly in the period studied in this article. In the 5 
canton of Lucerne the marriage restrictions did not refer directly to the resources of a 6 
potential bridal couple’s parents, but the authorities considered property rather than 7 
income as being important to the ability to raise offspring in an “honest way” (Kanton 8 
Luzern, 1831–1840, pp. 261–270, cited in Bossard-Borner, 2008, p. 545). An 9 
individual’s wealth and property depended much more on his or her parents’ resources 10 
than on income (Head-König, 1993; Mantl, 1999). Wealth and property inherited from 11 
the family of origin therefore became more decisive than other resources which were 12 
not directly linked to the family of origin. Conversely, marriage may be expected to be 13 
increasingly homogamous in respect of resources related to social origin and less to 14 
other characteristics. In short, the marriage restrictions of Lucerne probably increased 15 
the importance of the family of origin and, consequently, of homogamy by parental 16 
status. If we assume at least some degree of social homogamy, the selection of their 17 
spouses by high status individuals should not be substantially affected by marriage 18 
restrictions, because high status individuals only rarely chose their partners from the 19 
strata affected by marriage restrictions. That leads us to this third hypothesis, which is 20 
in two parts: 21 
H3a: Social homogamy increases with marriage restrictions. 22 
H3b: Marriage restrictions mainly affect homogamy among individuals of lower 23 
and middle social origin. 24 
17 
 
2.3 Modernization and marriage restrictions combined 1 
It is as impossible perfectly to measure Lucerne’s modernization as it is to measure the 2 
extent of its marriage restrictions. Nevertheless, we can make certain assumptions about 3 
the combination of the effects of the two. Changes to the marriage restrictions it is 4 
relatively well known from the literature. Restrictions increased in the first part of the 5 
analysed period, reached a peak around 1865 and then declined rapidly (for the exact 6 
timing, see the discussion in the next section). By contrast, the typical interpretation of 7 
the modernization thesis assumes the modernization process to be more or less linear 8 
development over time (cf., Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992, p. 21). It is therefore possible 9 
to deduce a basic hypothesis for how homogamy changes over time, given the presumed 10 
effects of marriage restrictions and modernization. 11 
---Figure 2 about here--- 12 
Figure 2 shows the combination of the effects of marriage restrictions and 13 
modernization. Because marriage restrictions are relevant primarily for individuals of 14 
lower and middle social origin, the combination of the two effects does not affect the 15 
relationship between modernization and homogamy. Therefore the hypothesis of 16 
decreasing homogamy over time (H1) remains directly applicable to individuals from 17 
higher social origin, irrespective of any marriage restrictions (Figure 2b). By contrast, 18 
for individuals of lower and middle class origin (Figure 2a) the increasing marriage 19 
restrictions in the first part of the observed period might be expected to cancel out or 20 
even reverse the diluting effect of modernization. For the period after 1865, however, 21 
both changes worked in the same direction, so that we may expect a clear decrease in 22 
social homogamy for that period. The combined effects on homogamy of marriage 23 
restrictions and modernization can therefore be summarized by these hypotheses: 24 
18 
 
H4a: Homogamy among individuals of higher social origin decreased over the 1 
whole period (1834–75). 2 
H4b: Homogamy among individuals of lower and middle social origin stagnated or 3 
increased in the period 1834–64. 4 
H4c: Homogamy among individuals of lower and middle social origin clearly 5 
decreased in the period 1865–75. 6 
2.4 Direct measurements of industrialization: the proportion of factory 7 
workers and the presence of railway stations 8 
So far, modernization has been discussed as a latent concept that develops with time. 9 
Because of that its effects can be tested indirectly, in this case by analysing social 10 
homogamy over time. That is in line with how classical studies have tested the 11 
modernization thesis (for example, Breen, 2004; Erikson & Goldthorpe, 1992). 12 
However, certain more recent studies have identified measurable sub-dimensions of 13 
modernization, such as the number of steam engines, expansion of education, and the 14 
spread of mass media. The effects of those things on phenomena such as social mobility 15 
have been tested (Knigge et al., 2014) and on social homogamy (Zijdeman & Maas, 16 
2010). Unfortunately, most such modernization measures are not available for the 17 
canton of Lucerne, although with two exceptions. We know the availability of rail 18 
connections, and we can make a rough estimate of the proportion of factory workers in 19 
each of the canton’s municipalities. 20 
Two lines of reasoning lead us to expect the availability of a rail connection to 21 
be related to the extent of homogamy. First, modern transport may be assumed to 22 
contribute to a common culture in which people do not differ greatly by geographical 23 
and social origin (Treiman, 1970). In other words, modern means of transport tend to 24 
reduce homogamy by social origin by loosening the link between the status of parents 25 
and children. A second line of reasoning considers the impact of things like railways at 26 
the individual level, for although rarely absolute, geographical boundaries can severely 27 
19 
 
reduce the likelihood of ever meeting a person from the other side of such a boundary. 1 
Modern transport therefore widens the “marriage horizon” of those looking for a spouse 2 
and thereby extends the boundaries of the marriage market (van Leeuwen & Maas, 3 
2005). The scope of the marriage market can affect parental homogamy via two paths. 4 
First, in wide marriage markets the likelihood of meeting someone of a different social 5 
background will be higher than in a narrow market, since living close-by makes a 6 
similar social background more likely (Goode, 1964, p. 34; Kalmijn & Flap, 2001; van 7 
Leeuwen & Maas, 2005, pp. 5–10). Second, a widening of the marriage market over 8 
time means that the social contacts of young people tend to go beyond the social 9 
networks of their parents, in both geographical and social terms.5 Both the lines of 10 
reasoning lead to the same hypothesis: 11 
H5: Homogamy was lower in parishes with a rail connection than in parishes 12 
without one. 13 
The argument for an existing relationship between the proportion of factory workers in 14 
a given area and the level of social homogamy follows similar lines of reasoning. A 15 
high proportion of factory workers is in the first place a proxy for the industrialization 16 
of an area and according to the modernization thesis may be associated with lower 17 
overall homogamy by social origin than in areas with a low proportion of factory 18 
workers (Treiman, 1970). Furthermore, factories bring together workers of different but 19 
low to middle social origin, which might contribute to the fading of the distinctiveness 20 
of social origin. Social networks formed in a factory can lay the foundations of future 21 
marriage. In mixed industries like the textile industry factory workers might meet a 22 
                                                 
5  Blossfeld and Timm (2003, pp. 10–11) made this point about educational expansion. 
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future spouse actually at work (Maas et al., 2011). As individuals of high social origin 1 
rarely became factory workers the proportion of factory workers is mainly relevant to 2 
individuals of lower or middle social origin. 3 
H6: Homogamy among individuals of low and middle social origin was weaker in 4 
parishes with a high proportion of factory workers than in other parishes. 5 
3 Data, measurements, and methodological approach 6 
3.1 Data 7 
The dataset used for this study was taken from the marriage registers presented in the 8 
first section and has been sampled following a stratified design. Marriages from three 9 
strata have been sampled independently: from the city of Lucerne, from parishes with 10 
no industry, and from parishes with at least some industry.6 We used a two-stage 11 
sampling design for the large area with no industry, randomly choosing 25 of 63 12 
parishes and then sampling marriages within the selected parishes. The chosen design 13 
ensured that each marriage in the area was selected with the same probability (Jann, 14 
2007). For all the 13 parishes with some industry and for the city of Lucerne a simple 15 
random sampling procedure was used (see Figure 1 for an overview of the parishes 16 
included). Information on 2,212 marriages was collected on both first and higher-order 17 
marriages. As the mating processes might differ for higher-order marriages, data only 18 
on first marriages was used for the analyses presented in this article. As a result, the 19 
                                                 
6 Parishes where the proportion of factory workers exceeded 2% were included in the stratum 
of parishes with at least some industry (according to Schnider  (1996, p. 48)).  
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analyses build on data on 1,499 marriages (excluding missing values).7 The sampling 1 
weights used for the statistical modelling compensate for the over- and under-2 
representation of certain areas due to the stratified design, and ensure that the data set is 3 
representative of the whole canton of Lucerne. 4 
3.2 Measuring homogamy 5 
In this article social homogamy is taken to mean that individuals tend to select a spouse 6 
of similar social origin. Thus as a first step, the social status of fathers must be 7 
measured to estimate the strength of social homogamy for a given area and period. To 8 
achieve that the occupational titles included in marriage registers can be coded 9 
according to the ‘Historical International Classification of Occupations’ (HISCO) 10 
proposed by van Leeuwen, Maas, and Miles (2002). A scale for occupational 11 
stratification is available for this classification-scheme: the ‘Historical CAMSIS’ 12 
(HISCAM) is based on social interactions, and ranks occupations on a continuous status 13 
scale (Lambert, Zijdeman, van Leeuwen, Maas, & Prandy, 2013).8 Such a measurement 14 
of the status of fathers of brides and grooms means we can use the correlation between 15 
the two as a measurement of homogamy by social origin, as it indicates how strongly 16 
parents’ statuses are associated (graph (a) in Figure 3). Regression models yield an 17 
estimate of the effect of the social status of one father on the social status of the other, 18 
so that interaction effects can then be used to explain those effects and so to test the 19 
hypotheses (graph (b) in Figure 3; for details see the technical discussion at the end of 20 
                                                 
7  380 cases were discounted because either the bride or the groom had been married before, 
333 cases were discounted because of missing values for one of the relevant variables. 
8  I have used the cross-nationally standardized version 0.1 for this article: HISCAM (2006). 
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this section). 1 
---Figure 3 about here--- 2 
Some of the hypotheses presented in the last section distinguish between homogamy 3 
among individuals of lower to middle and high social origin. To include that distinction 4 
in the analyses I split the explaining status variable into two linear splines. That means 5 
that the relationship between the statuses of the two fathers is not modelled as a single 6 
linear function, but rather with two linear functions knotted together. Separate estimates 7 
are therefore yielded for the association between the statuses of the fathers of each 8 
spouse, one for fathers with low to middle status and one for those of higher status. For 9 
this study I set the status of general farmers as the threshold between lower and higher 10 
status at (i.e., a HISCAM value of 60.9) so that farmers are at the top of the range of 11 
occupations defined here as of “low to medium status”. My thinking for that decision 12 
was that the occupational structure of the canton of Lucerne was strongly marked by 13 
two occupations, namely those of farm workers and of general farmers (compare Figure 14 
4 and its discussion in the next section). While the former were at the low and 15 
precarious end of the distribution of fathers’ statuses, the latter occupied the highest 16 
position in the agrarian sector. Considerably higher positions existed (father’s HISCAM 17 
values range from 32.5 to 99), but they applied only to a clear minority of the fathers 18 
(about 20% in the city of Lucerne, and only about 6% in the countryside). From that 19 
point of view general farmers therefore stood at the transition point from the lower and 20 
middle to higher socials status.9 I therefore used two linear splines with a knot at the 21 
                                                 
9 Figure 4 provides an additional argument for setting the threshold to the HISCAM value of a 
general farmer (60.9) as the relationship seems to change at this point.  
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HISCAM value for general farmers to estimate homogamy simultaneously among 1 
individuals of lower and middle origin, and of high social origin within the framework 2 
of regression models.10 3 
3.3 Variables explaining homogamy 4 
The same spline-based approach can be used to model time-trends in homogamy based 5 
on the date of a marriage. To test the hypotheses resulting from combining the effects of 6 
modernization and marriage restrictions the model should allow the time trend to 7 
change at the moment marriage restrictions began to be loosened again. As discussed in 8 
the section on the history of Lucerne canton, the marriage restrictions there peaked 9 
somewhere between 1856 and 1864 (Bossard-Borner, 2008, pp. 544–548). Because the 10 
restrictions were relaxed more rapidly than they were tightened, the turning point 11 
appears to be towards the end of that period. Furthermore, the data suggest that the 12 
effect on homogamy probably lagged behind the marriage restrictions. I tested three 13 
plausible spline definitions and although the differences are small, the solution best 14 
fitting the data is one with a knot at the end of the year 1864.11 While hypotheses H1 15 
predicting decreasing homogamy will be tested by means of linear overall time trends, 16 
                                                 
10 To enhance the interpretability of the interaction effects the explaining status variable is first 
centred on the knot before it is transformed to the two splines. When HISCAM is the original 
status value, the two splines are defined as follows:  
𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀1 = {
𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀 − 60.9, if 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀 ≤ 60.9
0, if 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀 > 60.9
  
𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀2 = {
0, if 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀 ≤ 60.9
𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀 − 60.9, if 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀 > 60.9
 
11 Bayesian Information Criteria (BIC) for the basic model are 333190.8 (knot end of 1860), 
333160.7 (end of 1862), 333140.9 (end of 1864), and 333142.4 (end of 1866) respectively. 
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all other time-based hypotheses can be tested by means of two linear splines, one for 1 
marriage dates before 1865 and one for marriage dates thereafter.12 I modelled those 2 
time trends for both the city of Lucerne and the countryside (all other parishes) using 3 
three-way interactions between the two splines for the status of fathers, the two splines 4 
for dates of marriages, and the indicator for Lucerne city. 5 
Two of my variables at parish level are based on external sources. The first 6 
stands for the presence of modern transport and indicates that a railway station was 7 
available in the corresponding parish at the time of the marriage concerned. The second 8 
variable measures the proportion of factory workers in each parish. Schnider (1996, 9 
p. 48) reports proportions of factory workers (adjusted for changes in the definition of 10 
factories) in the population of each municipality for the years 1856 and 1877, when 11 
factory censuses were carried out. Following his description of the economic cycles and 12 
waves of factory establishments (Schnider, 1996, pp. 41–69), we may assume that most 13 
of the factory jobs recorded in 1856 had been created around 1850, and that many of the 14 
additional jobs recorded in 1877 were created around 1865. That then allows a rough 15 
estimate of the longitudinal distribution of the proportions of factory workers in 16 
parishes. Schnider (1996, p. 48) reports the proportions in five categories: 0%, 0.1–2%, 17 
2.1–5%, 5.1–9%, and 9.1–44%. For my analyses, I collapsed the first and the last two 18 
                                                 
12  As with the explaining status variable, the date of marriage is first centred on the knot before 
it is transformed to the two splines. When date is the original date of marriage, the two 
splines are defined as follows:  
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒1 = {
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 31dec1864, if 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 ≤ 31dec1864
0, if 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 > 31dec1864
  
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒2 = {
0, if 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 ≤ 31dec1864
𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 − 31dec1864, if 𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒 > 31dec1864
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categories, because tests have shown that this more parsimonious three-fold 1 
categorization leads to the same results as the more detailed one. Therefore, my 2 
analyses are based on the following categories of proportions of factory workers in the 3 
parishes at the time of the marriage: 0–2%, 2.1–5%, and >5%. 4 
3.4 Methodological approach 5 
As pointed out when discussing the correlation between the fathers’ statuses as a 6 
measure of homogamy, interaction effects in regression models can be used to test 7 
hypotheses on factors affecting homogamy. In other words, to test the effects on 8 
homogamy of time, city, proximity of railway stations, and the proportion of factory 9 
workers, the corresponding variables interact with the two splines representing father’s 10 
status. However, the directed nature of regression models (one or multiple independent 11 
variable(s) explain one dependent variable) does not directly reflect the more or less 12 
symmetrical and mutually dependent nature of how spouses select each other. More 13 
technically, regression coefficients are sensitive to variance of both the explained and 14 
the explaining variable, which can lead to contradictory results. For example, imagine a 15 
shrinking variance over time in the status of the groom’s father but not of the bride’s 16 
father, while the correlation between them remains unchanged. In that situation a model 17 
explaining groom’s father’s status by bride’s father’s status will indicate decreasing 18 
homogamy, while the model for the opposite direction of explanation will lead to the 19 
opposite conclusion. This is problematic because there is no reason to favour one of the 20 
two directions of explanation. A solution to that problem is to estimate both directions 21 
of explanation simultaneously, and to constrain the coefficients related to homogamy to 22 
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be equal for both directions of explanation.13 Unobserved differences between contexts 1 
can confound the results, and one way to control for this at least partly is to include 2 
random effects on the levels of parishes by estimating multi-level models.14 Multi-level 3 
models with effects constrained, but simultaneously estimated equations for both 4 
directions of explanations can be fitted within the framework of structural equation 5 
                                                 
13  Constraint across the two directions of explanation are the two splines for father’s status and 
the interaction effects of the covariates with those splines. Not constrained are the constants 
and the main effects of the covariates. 
14  Random slopes for the two status splines allow to control for differences in social 
homogamy between parishes. Preliminary results showed, however, that the estimated 
variances of the random slope for the lower status spline was very small. Consequently, the 
results remain qualitatively the same when removing the random slope. Favouring the more 
parsimonious of the otherwise equal models, I therefore used multilevel models clustered by 
parish, with random intercepts and a random slope for the higher (but not for the lower) 
status splines. The equations read as follows: 
|
𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑝 = 𝛽𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∙ 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑔𝑓𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ∙ 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑔𝑓𝑖𝑝
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛾𝑏 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑝 + 𝜇𝑝
𝑏 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑏
𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑔𝑓𝑖𝑝  = 𝛽𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∙ 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛽𝑖𝑝
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ∙ 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑝
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛾𝑔 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑝 + 𝜇𝑝
𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖
𝑔| 
𝛽𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑤 = 𝛼𝑙𝑜𝑤 + 𝛿𝑙𝑜𝑤 ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑝 𝛽𝑝
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝛼ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ + 𝛿ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ ∙ 𝑋𝑖𝑝  + 𝜏𝑝 
where 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑏𝑓𝑖𝑝  and 𝐻𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑀𝑔𝑓𝑖𝑝  is the HISCAM of the fathers of bride and groom, 𝑋𝑖𝑝 
is a set of covariates (varying either on individual- or parish-level (subscript i, and p, 
respectively)), 𝛽𝑖𝑝
𝑙𝑜𝑤 and 𝛽𝑖𝑝
ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ
 are the homogamy parameters for low and high status 
homogamy, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are parameters explaining homogamy (constraint to be equal for both 
equations), 𝜏𝑝 is a random slope, 𝛾 are the equation-specific parameters of the main effects, 
and 𝜇𝑝 an equation-specific random intercept. 
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models.15 1 
The results for homogamy presented in the next section are based on four such 2 
models. The first model uses linear time trends to estimate homogamy over time for 3 
rural areas and Lucerne city. The second replaces the overall time trend by two linear 4 
splines, in order to test changing trends. The third and fourth models additionally 5 
include the variables for a nearby railway station, or dummy variables for parishes with 6 
respectively a factory worker proportion of 2.1–5% and more than 5%.16 For these 7 
models, the observations from the city of Lucerne have been excluded, as there is not 8 
enough contextual variation to estimate the effect of the two variables. To enhance the 9 
readability of the results only post-estimation results (such as average marginal effects 10 
or linear combinations of the coefficients) and graphical representations of the 11 
coefficients are reported in the main body of the article (but compare the full regression 12 
tables for all models in the appendix). 13 
4 Results 14 
As outlined in the last section, this article understands social homogamy as the 15 
correlation between the status of a bride’s father and that of a groom’s father. It is an 16 
inherently bivariate concept which cannot be measured on the individual level nor 17 
reported in tables with descriptive statistics. All the same, Table 1 gives a first overview 18 
                                                 
15  I should like to thank publicly here one of the anonymous reviewers for the suggestion to use 
structural equation models to combine the advantages of the constraint approach with those 
of multi-level models. Models estimated using Stata 15 (StataCorp, 2017). 
16  To avoid biases caused by collider variables I used separate models to estimate the effects of 
availability of a nearby railway station and of industrialization (Elwert & Winship, 2014). 
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of the measures behind homogamy: the status of the groom’s and bride’s fathers 1 
measured on the HISCAM scale. Overall, the distribution of the two are similar. They 2 
range from 32.5 (HISCAM value for not closer defined workers) to 99 (HISCAM value 3 
assigned to occupations such as medical doctors, lawyers, or professors), have a mean 4 
of between 51 and 52 (‘cartwright’ is a frequent occupation in this range) and a standard 5 
deviation of about 12. The fathers of a couple who were married in the city had a status 6 
on average about half a standard deviation higher than the fathers of those who married 7 
in the countryside. While the average of the bride’s father’s status is slightly higher than 8 
that of the groom’s father, the mean difference and the individual difference are 9 
marginally significant at most (unpaired: 𝑡(2996) = 1.27, 𝑝 = .20 and paired: 10 
𝑡(1498) = 1.77, 𝑝 = .08 respectively). 11 
 12 
---Table 1 about here--- 13 
 14 
---Figure 4 about here--- 15 
Figure 4 gives a first impression of the association between the statuses of the two 16 
fathers. The scatterplots, both for the countryside and for the city, are characterized by a 17 
square in the lower left corner, formed by farm labourers (HISCAM: 37.1) and general 18 
farmers (HISCAM: 60.9). The graph shows too that a daughter or son of a farm labourer 19 
rarely married the son or daughter of a man whose occupational status was higher than 20 
that of a general farmer. Although the social stratification of the fathers of those married 21 
in the city was also marked by farming occupations, their statuses were clearly more 22 
evenly distributed around the mean. In the countryside, by contrast, the picture was 23 
dominated by occupations with rather low statuses. 24 
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The local polynomial (lpoly) smooth plots in the same graph show how the two 1 
statuses were locally associated. Three observations from those smoothers are 2 
noteworthy. First, the relationship in the countryside was steeper overall than that in the 3 
city. Simple correlations confirm that observation, as it was substantially tighter outside 4 
(𝑟 = .54) than inside the city of Lucerne (𝑟 = .31). Second, for rural Lucerne, the lpoly 5 
line bends just above the status of general farmers (HISCAM 60.9), while the 6 
relationship is otherwise rather linear, both inside and outside the city. Third, whereas 7 
the two directions of explanation generally agree very well, that is less true for higher 8 
status in the countryside. 9 
Two aspects concerning the other variables deserve to be highlighted. First, the 10 
means of year of marriage lie after the middle of the observed period (1834–75), 11 
especially in the city. That stems from an increase in marriages towards the end of the 12 
period. Second, although the factory industry particularly flourished around the city of 13 
Lucerne, the proportion of factory workers in the city itself never surpassed the 14 
threshold of 2%. 15 
4.1 City versus countryside 16 
Comparing homogamy in rural Lucerne and the city of Lucerne, the results presented in 17 
Figure 5 show distinct results for homogamy between individuals of lower and higher 18 
social origin. In rural Lucerne, a high level of homogamy can be found for marriages of 19 
couples of low and middle status origin. On average, one partner’s father’s status was 20 
.63 points higher on the HISCAM scale if the other partner’s father had a status that was 21 
one point higher. At the same time, homogamy among high origin individuals was very 22 
low in the countryside, and cannot be said to be significantly different from zero – also 23 
because of the low number of observations. In the city of Lucerne, the situation was 24 
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different. On the low to middle origin side, the association was estimated at .25 – about 1 
.38 lower than in the countryside (𝑝 < .001). In contrast to the countryside, homogamy 2 
among high origin individuals in the city seems to have been higher than among those 3 
of low to middle origin, although the difference between low and high origin 4 
homogamy is not statistically significant (𝑝 = .177). However, homogamy among those 5 
of higher social origin was clearly stronger for couples married in the city than for those 6 
married in other parishes. Because of the low number of cases, that difference is 7 
imprecisely estimated and only marginally significant (𝑝 = .052). 8 
--- Figure 5 about here--- 9 
In sum, the model yields mixed results for the contrast between the city and the 10 
countryside. For individuals of lower or middle social origin (the vast majority of the 11 
population), social homogamy according to parental status was considerably lower in 12 
the city than in rural Lucerne. That is in line with the prediction of the modernization 13 
thesis (hypothesis H2) although that conclusion is not valid for the elites. Homogamy 14 
among individuals of high social origin was notable in the city of Lucerne but very low 15 
and perhaps even non-existent in rural areas. 16 
4.2 Time trends 17 
Turning to time trends in social homogamy, the distinction between homogamy among 18 
couples from lower and middle origin on the one hand, and those from high origin on 19 
the other, continued to be important – especially in the rural part of the canton. I 20 
estimated two models (appendix, Table A1) to test hypotheses on general time trends 21 
(H1), changing trends due to changing marriage restrictions (H3), and on the 22 
combination of the two (H4). While the first includes one linear time trend for the 23 
whole period, the second uses two linear splines. 24 
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Figure 6, based on this latter model, displays the estimated association between the two 1 
fathers’ statuses by date of marriage separately for lower and higher origin individuals, 2 
and for the city and parishes outside the city of Lucerne. It gives a straightforward 3 
overview of the different time trends. For a more precise interpretation of the strength 4 
and statistical significance of the time trends, Table 2 reports the estimated yearly 5 
changes, separately for the overall trend and for the two splines. 6 
--- Figure 6 about here --- 7 
 8 
---Table 2 about here--- 9 
Figure 6 does not reveal a pronounced overall trend. While in rural Lucerne homogamy 10 
among higher status individuals was declining over the whole period, the very wide 11 
confidence intervals suggest imprecisely estimated trends. Table 2 confirms that 12 
impression, for with one exception the overall trends are neither strong nor statistically 13 
significant. The exception concerns homogamy among higher status individuals married 14 
in the city of Lucerne, which slowly but significantly strengthened over time.  15 
If we look at the periods before and after 1865 separately, we see that the trends 16 
were more pronounced. With the exception of higher status homogamy in rural areas all 17 
trends followed the same pattern as homogamy increased from 1834–64 but decreased 18 
after then (all trends are statistically significant except the decrease of homogamy 19 
among individuals from lower and middle origin in rural Lucerne (𝑝 = .119)).  20 
From those results we can infer that the changing severity of the marriage 21 
restrictions was the main driver of the trends in homogamy (hypothesis H3). In other 22 
words, homogamy’s development paralleled the changing nature of the marriage 23 
restrictions, as described in the literature (Bossard-Borner, 1998, 2008). In Lucerne city 24 
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this was true for individuals from all social strata, while in rural Lucerne no clear trends 1 
have been found for those from higher social origins. That is only partly in line with the 2 
rationale behind the hypotheses for the combined effect of modernization and marriage 3 
restrictions (H4), assuming only the lower strata were affected by the changing marriage 4 
restrictions. 5 
No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that modernization caused 6 
homogamy to decrease over time (H1). It is possible that such a trend did exist but was 7 
completely masked by other processes, such as the changing marriage restrictions. 8 
However, the fact that the only significant overall trend points in the opposite direction 9 
suggests that the modernization thesis is missing an important aspect, at least for this 10 
early phase of modernization. 11 
4.3 Direct measures 12 
While the time trends do not directly reflect effects on homogamy of modernization, the 13 
story told by the direct measures of industrialization and modernization is more 14 
nuanced. While the results presented in Figure 7 do not suggest that a rail connection 15 
affected homogamy, the proportion of factory workers in a parish did matter. 16 
--- Figure 7 about here--- 17 
Regarding homogamy among individuals of low and middle origin, the results are in 18 
line with hypothesis H6. In that part of the population homogamy decreased with the 19 
proportion of factory workers in the parish. It was moderately and marginally 20 
significantly lower in parishes where the proportion of factory workers surpassed 2%, 21 
and clearly and highly significantly lower where it exceeded 5%. In respect to 22 
homogamy among high-origin individuals, the results remain unclear. While the 23 
coefficients are strongly negative, the very large confidence intervals do not permit us 24 
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to come to any conclusion.  1 
5 Conclusion and discussion 2 
In addition to new data, three original features of this study have allowed new insights 3 
into the effects of social origin on the spouse selection process during the course of 4 
modernization, both in general and specifically with respect to the canton of Lucerne. 5 
First, regarding the marriage restrictions I have explicitly considered a phenomenon 6 
which interferes with the effects on social homogamy of modernization and 7 
industrialization. Next, I have presented theoretical arguments and empirical evidence 8 
for a fruitful separation of the analysis of homogamy by social strata. Finally, I have 9 
proposed analysing homogamy using multilevel models with constraint simultaneous 10 
equations for both directions of explanation. This has provided a way of making 11 
available the advantages of multilevel models for the analysis of homogamy by social 12 
origin, while respecting its symmetrical and mutually dependent nature.  13 
The results yielded by this approach lead to three conclusions. An interesting 14 
first finding is that the homogamy of couples of lower and middle origin was far 15 
stronger in rural areas than in the city, while the opposite was true for couples of high 16 
social origin. In rural areas the strong homogamy among lower origin individuals was 17 
probably the result of the strong homogamy within the farming community (Bull, 2005; 18 
Dribe & Lundh, 2009) whereas the very weak high status homogamy may be attributed 19 
to the fact that in rural areas it was difficult to find a partner of similarly high origin 20 
(van Leeuwen & Maas, 2005, p. 10). Differences in social homogamy between the rural 21 
part of the canton and the city of Lucerne were probably caused by two things. First, 22 
because of long-standing specificities in patterns of family formation in the cities 23 
(Lynch, 1991) and second because of strong migration to the city that itself affected the 24 
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processes behind family formation (Moreels & Matthijs, 2010; Schumacher, Matthijs, & 1 
Moreels, 2013). Future research focusing on the difference between the city and the 2 
countryside should therefore consider both bride’s and groom’s migration background 3 
in order to disentangle the two effects.  4 
A first conclusion from the tests of the derived hypotheses is that they are 5 
generally supported by the data, but mainly in respect to homogamy among individuals 6 
of lower and middle social origin. For that part of the population, the time trends found 7 
in homogamy were in line with presumptions about the effect of marriage restrictions. 8 
In other words, homogamy in the canton of Lucerne was strong around 1865 when the 9 
marriage restrictions peaked, but lower before and after that peak. That is in line with 10 
hypotheses H3 and H4 and fits neatly into the picture of the inequality-preserving 11 
effects of marriage restrictions drawn by Mantl (1999). In that part of the population the 12 
modernization thesis, too, receives support, at least partially. On the one hand the higher 13 
homogamy found in the countryside than in the city (H2), and the existing negative 14 
relationship between the proportion of factory workers and homogamy (H6), both 15 
support the modernization thesis. On the other hand, a general modernization trend in 16 
homogamy (H1) was either too weak to offset the effect of the increasing marriage 17 
restrictions in the period before 1865 or did not exist at all. Furthermore, the presumed 18 
negative relationship between an existing connection to the railway system and 19 
homogamy (H5) could not be confirmed by the data from Lucerne. As described in the 20 
section on the canton of Lucerne, the canton was clearly modernizing during the 19th 21 
century – for example in agriculture and education – but industrialization was limited to 22 
a few areas. We may therefore interpret the results in the sense that industrialization 23 
alone, and no other aspects of modernization, affected homogamy in the canton of 24 
Lucerne. That conclusion is broadly in line with previous research on homogamy during 25 
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early modernization, as most studies found no clear time trends (Bull, 2005; Dribe 1 
& Lundh, 2009; Maas & van Leeuwen, 2005; van Leeuwen & Maas, 2002) although 2 
they did find effects of more directly measured industrialization (Lippényi, van 3 
Leeuwen, Maas, & Őri, 2017; Maas et al., 2011; Zijdeman & Maas, 2010). Decreasing 4 
homogamy by social origin with industrialization suggests that industrialization did 5 
indeed change something in the process of family formation. The result is an indication 6 
that the influence of parents on family formation diminished during the course of 7 
industrialization. In Lucerne, evidence for that can be found only by analysing the effect 8 
of directly measured industrialization, as suggested by Puschmann and Solli (2014). The 9 
fact that industrialization effects have been found in Lucerne is remarkable insofar as 10 
industrialization remained relatively weak even in the areas of the canton that were 11 
further industrialized. 12 
While the results for homogamy among individuals of lower and middle origin 13 
are essentially in line both with my hypotheses and with previous research, that is not 14 
true for homogamy in couples of higher social origin. Although the small number of 15 
cases mean that the estimates are imprecise, nevertheless two results clearly contradict 16 
the hypotheses derived from the modernization thesis. In that higher stratum homogamy 17 
was much stronger in the city than in rural Lucerne, and in the city the overall trend 18 
towards homogamy was positive, not negative as claimed by the modernization thesis. 19 
Building on sector dualism discussed by Kuznets (1955), the idea of generalized 20 
dualism fits these observations, for it assumes that modernization processes such as 21 
industrialization or educational expansion, first increase and only later decreases 22 
inequality (Knigge et al., 2014; Nielsen, 1994). If increasing concentration of income 23 
and wealth was relevant to homogamy it is probable that it affected mainly individuals 24 
of high social origin. Consequently, for those couples increasing inequality might have 25 
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counteracted the otherwise decreasing importance of social origin and led to the 1 
observed increase of homogamy by social origin.  2 
In the end this study is limited by the data, especially with respect to the 3 
population from higher origin brackets. Although the newly collected dataset used for 4 
this article includes 1,499 usable observations, it is still relatively small, especially 5 
compared against other historical datasets that have grown over time, like the databases 6 
from Sweden (Landsarkivet i Lund, 2016; Umeå University, 2016) or the Netherlands 7 
(Centraal Bureau voor Genealogie, 2016). That relatively small size naturally limits the 8 
data’s statistical power, especially if a number of sub-groups are analysed. Furthermore, 9 
additional high quality indicators for modernization on the level of the individual 10 
parishes would clearly extend the scope of those aspects of modernization which could 11 
be analysed.  12 
Despite those limitations the new data allows us to study aspects of social 13 
stratification in an agrarian area which was partly industrializing during the 19th 14 
century. It also allows  research on social homogamy to be expanded into a hitherto 15 
unstudied context, but most importantly this data has led to the generation of new 16 
insights that are worth further investigation. Three key findings raise questions for 17 
future research. First, the findings suggest that the relevant mechanisms can differ by 18 
social strata. Future researchers might want to respect heterogeneous effects by social 19 
strata in order to avoid glossing over existing differences. The second finding reminds 20 
us that historical processes are rarely unidimensional and monotonous. In Lucerne, 21 
pauperism was attributed to industrialization outside the canton, and the authorities 22 
reacted by tightening marriage restrictions. The time trends found in homogamy support 23 
the assumption that Lucerne’s tightening of its marriage restrictions amplified the 24 
importance of social origin in respect to spouse selection, counteracting the effect of 25 
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modernization. Future research might add to this finding by both explicitly considering 1 
and directly measuring political or social reactions to modernization when analysing 2 
modernization processes. All the more so in fact, since the third finding confirms the 3 
conclusion of previous studies that modernization effects should be tested as directly as 4 
possible (Maas et al., 2011; Puschmann & Solli, 2014; Zijdeman & Maas, 2010). 5 
Although the time trends in the canton of Lucerne did not reflect any effects of 6 
modernization, direct measurements show that industrialization had an effect on 7 
homogamy by social origin.  8 
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6 Appendix 1 
--- Table A1 about here--- 2 
 3 
--- Table A2 about here--- 4 
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7 Tables 1 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of variables used 2 
 Mean (standard deviation) Minimum Maximum 
 
Rural 
Lucerne 
City of 
Lucerne Total Total Total 
Groom’s father: 
HISCAMa 
51.8 
(12.4) 
57.1 
(12.5) 
53.5 
(12.7) 
32.5 99 
      
Bride’s father:  
HISCAMa 
51.1 
(11.6) 
56.7 
(12.2) 
53.0 
(12.1) 
33.6 99 
      
Date of marriage 
(years)b 
1856.9 
(13.2) 
1860.7 
(13.1) 
1858.2 
(13.3) 
1834 1875 
      
Railway station  
in parish* 
0.14 
 
0.64 
 
0.31 
 
0 1 
      
Factory workers  
in parish: 0–2%* 
0.76 
 
1 
 
0.84 
 
0 1 
      
Factory workers  
in parish: 2.1–5%* 
0.13 
 
0 
 
0.086 
 
0 1 
      
Factory workers  
in parish: >5%* 
0.12 
 
0 
 
0.077 
 
0 1 
Observations 1002 497 1499   
a If used as independent variable: centered around 60.9 before transformed into two linear splines: one below and one 3 
above this value. 4 
b Centered around December 31, 1864 before transformed into two linear splines: one before and one after this date. 5 
* Dummy variables, mean = proportion. 6 
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Table 2. Time trends: yearly changes of parental status homogamy in rural Lucerne and 1 
Lucerne city; linear combinations based on models in Table A117 2 
 Overall trends Linear splines 
Low to medium status:   
 overall (rural) 0.00385  
 1834-64 (rural)  0.00886** 
 1865-75 (rural)  -0.0176 
 overall (city) -0.000548  
 1834-64 (city)  0.00672*** 
 1865-75 (city)  -0.0217*** 
High status:   
 overall (rural) -0.00492  
 1834-64 (rural)  -0.00315 
 1865-75 (rural)  -0.0148 
 overall (city) 0.00217*  
 1834-64 (city)  0.00929*** 
 1865-75 (city)  -0.0226* 
N 1499 1499 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 3 
 4 
  5 
                                                 
17  For rural Lucerne, these are merely the interaction effects between the splines for marriage 
date and fathers’ HISCAM, from Table A1. For the city, the table shows the linear 
combination of those interaction effects and the three-way interactions among year, status 
and the indicator for the city of Lucerne. 
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Table A1. Time trends: results from regression models 1 
 (1) (2) 
 Time (linear)  
and city vs. countryside 
Time (splines)  
and city vs. countryside 
Coefficients constraint to be equal for both directions of explanation 
Main effects     
HISCAM ≤ 60.9 0.649*** (0.0451) 0.757*** (0.0615) 
HISCAM > 60.9 0.0736 (0.0975) 0.0979 (0.198) 
Interactions with: HISCAM ≤ 60.9     
City of Lucerne -0.400*** (0.0498) -0.380*** (0.0663) 
Year 0.00385 (0.00282)   
Year before 1865   0.00886** (0.00320) 
Year from 1865   -0.0176 (0.0113) 
City of Lucerne # Year -0.00440 (0.00296)   
City of Lucerne # Year before 1865   -0.00214 (0.00325) 
City of Lucerne # Year from 1865   -0.00418 (0.0115) 
Interactions with: HISCAM > 60.9     
City of Lucerne 0.541* (0.238) 0.641* (0.277) 
Year -0.00492 (0.0112)   
Year before 1865   -0.00315 (0.0136) 
Year from 1865   -0.0148 (0.0430) 
City of Lucerne # Year 0.00709 (0.0111)   
City of Lucerne # Year before 1865   0.0124 (0.0138) 
City of Lucerne # Year from 1865   -0.00780 (0.0446) 
Random effects     
Var(HISCAM > 60.9) 0.315 (0.0829) 0.323 (0.0882) 
Additional coefficients explaining bride's father's HISCAM 
Year 0.00209 (0.0422)   
Year before 1865   0.0476 (0.0596) 
Year from 1865   -0.210 (0.219) 
City of Lucerne -0.446 (0.703) -0.573 (1.003) 
City of Lucerne # Year -0.0683 (0.0428)   
City of Lucerne # Year before 1865   -0.0615 (0.0600) 
City of Lucerne # Year from 1865   -0.00886 (0.219) 
Constant 58.12 (0.653) 59.05 (0.979) 
Random effects     
Var(Constant) 4.965 (1.201) 4.773 (1.176) 
Var(Residual) 109.5 (10.34) 109.3 (10.34) 
Additional coefficients explaining groom's father's HISCAM 
Year 0.0600 (0.0457)   
Year before 1865   0.110* (0.0500) 
Year from 1865   -0.170 (0.179) 
City of Lucerne -2.036 (1.577) -2.365 (1.773) 
City of Lucerne # Year -0.0338 (0.0497)   
City of Lucerne # Year before 1865   -0.0449 (0.0515) 
City of Lucerne # Year from 1865   0.0731 (0.187) 
Constant 57.98 (0.718) 59.16 (0.797) 
Random effects     
Var(Constant) 6.500 (1.567) 6.716 (1.596) 
Var(Residual) 80.22 (9.953) 79.65 (10.10) 
Observations 1499  1499  
Standard errors in parentheses 2 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 3 
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Table A2. Railway stations and factory workers: results from regression models 1 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Basic: time, rural only Basic + 
 railway station 
Basic + 
 factory workers 
Coefficients constraint to be equal for both directions of explanation 
Main effects       
HISCAM ≤ 60.9 0.757*** (0.0615) 0.745*** (0.0673) 0.805*** (0.0685) 
HISCAM > 60.9 0.109 (0.200) 0.113 (0.218) 0.153 (0.227) 
Interactions with: HISCAM ≤ 60.9     
Year before 1865 0.00880** (0.00318) 0.00838* (0.00341) 0.0107** (0.00325) 
Year from 1865 -0.0176 (0.0113) -0.0175 (0.0113) -0.0149 (0.0109) 
Railway station in 
parish 
  0.0827 (0.112)   
Factory workers in 
parish: 2.1-5% 
    -0.161+ (0.0932) 
Factory workers in 
parish: >5% 
    -0.265** (0.0978) 
Interactions with: HISCAM > 60.9      
Year before 1865 -0.00258 (0.0137) -0.00233 (0.0148) -0.000596 (0.0145) 
Year from 1865 -0.0165 (0.0432) -0.0158 (0.0444) -0.00969 (0.0415) 
Railway station in 
parish 
  -0.0359 (0.348)   
Factory workers in 
parish: 2.1-5% 
    -0.108 (0.433) 
Factory workers in 
parish: >5% 
    -0.811 (0.646) 
Random effects       
Var(HISCAM > 
60.9) 
0.340 (0.0952) 0.337 (0.0954) 0.449 (0.151) 
Additional coefficients explaining bride's father's HISCAM 
Year before 1865 0.0468 (0.0596) 0.0342 (0.0666) 0.0718 (0.0660) 
Year from 1865 -0.211 (0.219) -0.212 (0.220) -0.203 (0.223) 
Railway station in 
parish 
  1.952 (1.776)   
Factory workers in 
parish: 2.1-5% 
    -1.921 (1.507) 
Factory workers in 
parish: >5% 
    -3.060 (1.929) 
Constant 59.04 (0.981) 58.70 (1.129) 59.70 (1.162) 
Random effects       
Var(Constant) 5.077 (1.226) 4.799 (1.160) 5.145 (1.276) 
Var(Residual) 105.7 (11.21) 105.6 (11.23) 105.5 (11.27) 
Additional coefficients explaining groom's father's HISCAM 
Year before 1865 0.109* (0.0499) 0.110* (0.0521) 0.151** (0.0536) 
Year from 1865 -0.169 (0.180) -0.175 (0.181) -0.119 (0.177) 
Railway station in 
parish 
  0.0311 (1.661)   
Factory workers in 
parish: 2.1-5% 
    -3.439** (1.083) 
Factory workers in 
parish: >5% 
    -5.966*** (1.553) 
Constant 59.15 (0.797) 59.17 (0.875) 60.29 (0.985) 
Random effects       
Var(Constant) 6.929 (1.668) 6.998 (1.678) 6.769 (1.539) 
Var(Residual) 72.95 (9.130) 72.95 (9.127) 71.73 (9.190) 
Observations 1002  1002  1002  
Standard errors in parentheses 2 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 3 
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8 Figures 1 
Figure 1. Map of Switzerland, and map showing the selected parishes within the canton 2 
of Lucerne. Sources: map of Switzerland: Dufour (1855), reproduced by permission of 3 
swisstopo (BA17032); map of Lucerne: Schnider (1996, 48, 261), reproduced by 4 
permission of Geoinformation Kanton Luzern; railway lines added according to: Wägli 5 
and Jacobi (2010); own shading. 6 
 7 
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Figure 2. Scheme of the combination of the effects on homogamy of modernization and 1 
marriage restriction among individuals of (a) low to middle and (b) high social origin. 2 
 3 
Figure 3. Measuring (a) and explaining (b) social homogamy. 4 
 5 
Figure 4. Groom’s father’s and bride’s father’s status for rural Lucerne and Lucerne 6 
city: scatterplots and local polynomial (lpoly) smooth plots; circle sizes are proportional 7 
to the prevalence of the status combinations. 8 
 9 
Groom’s father’s HISCAM
Bride’s father’s HISCAM
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Figure 5. City vs. countryside: parental status homogamy by social stratum; average 1 
marginal effects based on model 1 in Table A1. 2 
 3 
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Figure 6. Time trends: parental status homogamy by date of marriage and social stratum 1 
in the city of Lucerne and in the countryside; average marginal effects based on model 2 2 
in Table A1. 3 
 4 
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Figure 7. Effects on parental status homogamy of railway station in parish, and of 1 
proportion of factory workers by social stratum; graphical representation of selected 2 
coefficients from model 2 and 3 in Table A2. 3 
 4 
